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Constitutional Civil Law
by Albert Sidney Johnson*
and
Susan Cole Mullis**

During the 1992 survey period, the most noticeable aspect of the constitutional civil law jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit was the large body of circuit jurisprudence concerning the First Amendment, both in the context of ballot access and the
rights of public employees. The Eleventh Circuit also issued several opinions on constitutionalized procedural issues such as standing, abstention,
preclusion, and ripeness. The court's receptiveness to these preliminary
defenses provides an opportunity for government defendants to avoid litigation on the merits in appropriate cases.
Once again, the circuit's qualified immunity opinions illustrate the continuing circuit discord over the application of the defense. However, during 1992, the court issued several opinions clarifying the role of the defense at trial. The circuit extended immediate appealability of pretrial
denials of immunity to orders denying state law sovereign immunity.
During 1992, the Eleventh Circuit, like most circuit courts, failed to
resolve the issue of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to pretrial
detainees. However, the court did make important contributions to its
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence during the survey period.
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PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Immunity

Qualified Immunity. Over the past several years, the intracircuit
conflict over the appropriate application of the qualified immunity defense in civil rights cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section
1983)1 has been discussed in detail in this Article.2 A government official
has immunity to an action for civil damages unless the plaintiff can establish that the official "'knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].' ",3 In Anderson v. Creighton,4 the
Supreme Court determined that the constitutional right alleged to be violated must be sufficiently established to inform the official that his conduct violated the law, when viewed in light of the information available to
a reasonable official. s The Court warned that the viability of an "objective
reasonableness" standard in preserving immunity depended on the "level
of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified." The
Supreme Court's recent decisions on qualified immunity have been protective of the breadth of the doctrine.'
Eleventh Circuit decisions applying the Anderson "bright line test" do

not provide a consistent rule as to the level of generality of the legal rule
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States oi other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
Id.
2. See generally Albert Sidney Johnson, ConstitutionalLaw-Civil, 41 MERcER L. REv.
1261, 1261-64 (1990); Albert Sidney Johnson & Susan Cole Mullis, Constitutional
Law-Civil, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1313, 1313-20 (1991); and Albert Sidney Johnson & Susan
Cole Mullis, Constitutional Law-Civil, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1075, 1075-82 (1992).
3. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1975)).
4. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
5. Id. at 641-42.
6. Id. at 639.
7. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1992) (qualified 'immunity should be decided prior to trial and should protect all but the "plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"); Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991) (district court must
first determine whether the plaintiff has stated a constitutional violation before reaching
qualified immunity issue). But see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (rejecting higher pleading standard for municipal
liability, but declining to decide whether there is a heightened pleading standard for qualified immunity purposes).
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by which the defendant's conduct is to be judged." The division of the
panel in Adams V. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Department9 illustrates the
intracircuit conflict over the application of the "clearly established law"
element of the qualified immunity test. Although the court denied qualified immunity to the defendant sheriff deputies on the grounds that the
law was clearly established that their conduct was unconstitutional, each
member of the panel gave a divergent assessment of whether the law was
clearly established.10 The precise issue on appeal was whether it was
clearly established law in May 1985, the time of the incident, that the
intentional ramming of a vehicle during a high-speed chase by a law enforcement officer, causing the pursued vehicle to crash and thereby terminating the freedom of movement of a passenger in the vehicle, constituted
an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment." The incident in question occurred some six weeks" after the United States Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Garner.'3 Judge Hatchett, writing for
the court, upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. Judge Hatchett determined that the decision
in Garner, decided shortly before the incident in question, established
that a law enforcement officer may not use deadly force to seize an unarmed nondangerous suspect." Although the opinion recognized that
Garner did not address high-speed car chases, the court held that "'the
very conduct in question need not have been explicitly held to be unlaw8.

For example, some Eleventh Circuit decisions applying the Anderson "bright line

test" have held that it must be clearly established law that the defendant's specific conduct
was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1989); Dartland
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1989); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989). However, other panel decisions have required
only that the general constitutional right that was allegedly violated be clearly established,
without regard to whether the specific alleged conduct has been held in prior cases to violate
that constitutional right. See, e.g., Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829 (lth Cir. 1990); Powell
v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1990). In still other cases, in which the constitutional
analysis requires the balancing of interests, the court has found immunity appropriate unless the "inevitable conclusion" of the balancing of interests is that the conduct was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1990); Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1989).
9. 962 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc granted and panel opinion vacated,
982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993).
10. 962 F.2d at 1563. Circuit Judge Hatchett wrote the opinion denying qualified immunity to two deputy sheriffs; Senior Circuit Judge Hill wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1572
(Hill, J., concurring). Judge Edmondson wrote a strong dissent. Id. at 1573 (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting).
11. Id. at 1566.
12. Id. at 1568.
13. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a police officer's fatal
shooting of a fleeing suspect constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 7.
14. 962 F.2d at 1568-69.
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ful prior to the time the official acted.' "5 The court held that the defendants were required to relate the established law of Garner to what it
deemed to be a factually analogous situation."' The concurring opinion of
Senior Circuit Judge Hill held that qualified immunity should be denied
because one resolution of the facts in dispute would be that the deputies
intentionally rammed the vehicle for the purpose of stopping the driver,
17
which he determined would constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Judge Edmondson- dissented, stating that "the court today has carved out
an exception to the general rule of qualified immunity and would require
police officers to foretell perfectly the evolution of Fourth Amendment
law, even when that evolution has still not clearly established that the
events in this case violated the Constitution."1 8 Judge Edmondson disagreed with the court's application of the "clearly established law" standard, stating that while the plaintiff is not required to establish that the
exact factual precedent was clearly established, the facts in the case relied
on as precedent must be "materially similar."'1
In Wright v. Whiddon,20 in contrast, the court of appeals reversed the
district court and held that an officer was entitled to qualified immunity
from the Fourth Amendment claims of a pretrial detainee who was shot
and killed during an escape attempt.2 1 In Wright the unarmed pretrial
detainee escaped from the courthouse and was shot by sheriff officers in
pursuit.2 2 The incident in question occurred approximately six months af-

ter the decision in Garner." The panel distinguished Garner on the
grounds that the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, not a suspect fleeing to
avoid custody.2 4 Relying on Graham v. Connor,2 5 the court determined
that the issue of whether a pretrial detainee may press a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment was unresolved. Accordingly, the
court concluded that "[t]he presence of such doubt about the existence
and content of the constitutional right that [the defendant] is alleged to
have violated is enough to entitled him to qualified immunity."
15.

Id. at 1569 (quoting Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1504).

16. Id.
17. Id. at 1572-73.
18. Id. at 1574.
19. Id. at 1576.
20. 951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1992).
21. Id. at 300.
22. Id, at 298.
23. Id. at 299.
24. 'Id. at 300.
25. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
26. 951 F.2d at 600. Similarly, in Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362 (11th
Cir. 1993) (on rehearing), modifying 966 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1992), the panel held that "a
right is clearly established only if the unlawfulness of the conduct that allegedly violates the
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The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Adams 2 7 in early

1993, vacating the panel opinion. The rehearing en banc promises an atthe clearly established law
tempt to resolve the intracircuit conflict over
28
prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Once pretrial immunity has been denied because of the existence of
factual disputes precluding an immunity determination, the issue becomes what role qualified immunity is to play in the trial of the case. In
the 1991 case of Ansley v. Heinrich,2 the court determined that immunity is not an appropriate issue for jury trial determination. The court
held that "qualified immunity is an affirmative defense from trial and not
a defense to liability issues raised during trial."30
The court revisited the jury trial issue in 1992 in Stone v. Peacock.31 In
Stone defendants' pretrial assertions of qualified immunity were defeated, as were their motions for directed verdict at trial. 32 The district
court instructed the jury on the merits of plaintiff's case and on defendants' qualified immunity defense. The jury returned verdicts for defendants."3 The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's instruction to
the jury on the qualified immunity defense was harmful error requiring
reversal of defendants' general jury verdict.34 The court held that the
qualified immunity issue was a legal determination that should be decided before trial, during trial, or after trial, but that should "seldom, if
right would have been apparent to an objective, reasonable official 'in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred.',"
Cherry, 980 F.2d at 1369 (quoting Nicholson v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 918
F.2d 145, 147 (11th Cir. 1990)). The court held that qualified immunity was appropriate
because the "legal similarity" between plaintiff's claim and the existing development of the
law "would not have been readily apparent to government officials attempting to do their
jobs on a day-to-day basis." Id. at 1370.
27. Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993).
28. The circuit has made at least two prior efforts to hear a qualified immunity case en
banc in recent years. See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, vacated, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.
1991).
29. 925 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1991).
30. Id, at 1348.
31. 968 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1992). Cf. Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 465-69 (11th Cir.
1992) (The court did not address plaintiff's assertion that the district court erred in submitting the issue of qualified immunity to the jury. The court held that plaintiff waived the
issue for the purposes of appeal by failing to object to the qualified immunity charge before
the jury began deliberating. Moreover, the special interrogatories regarding the liability issues established that there was no harmful error.); see also Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1567 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc granted and opinion
vacated, 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993) and Bailey v.Board of County Comm'rs of Alachua
County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1126 n.17 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 98 (1992).
32. 968 F.2d at 1165.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1165-66.
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ever" be, submitted to the jury. 5 The instruction of the jury on the qualified immunity defense was harmful error because it could not be determined from the general jury verdict that the jury decided the case on the
merits and not on the basis of the qualified immunity defense.3 s The
court remanded the case for the district court to determine the legal issue
of whether qualified immunity was appropriate, on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.3 7 The district court was instructed that if it

determined that defendants were not entitled to the immunity, then the
merits of the case should be submitted to the jury without mention of the
qualified immunity defense." The Eleventh Circuit held that if disputed
issues of fact prevented the district court from making the qualified immunity determination, then special interrogatories to the jury would be
39

appropriate.

Absolute Immunity. During 1992, the Eleventh Circuit issued two
opinions clarifying the scope of the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity. An official is entitled to absolute immunity when the official acts in
a legislative capacity.' The official must establish that the absolute immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue." The legislative immunity extends to state and local legislators. 2 In 1991 in Crymes
v. DeKalb County,43 the court adopted the rationale of Front Royal &
35.

Id., at 1165.

36. Id. at 1166 (citing Ansley, 925 F.2d at 1347-49). The court explained that the instruction in Ansley was notharmful error because the court employed special interrogatories. Id.; see also Stevens v. Gay, 792 F.2d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (cited for comparative
purposes by the court in Stone, in which the panel held that the charge was not reversible
error).
37. 968 F.2d at 1165.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1166. See Hancock, 967 F.2d at 465-69 (even though the court submitted the
qualified immunity issue to the jury, the special interrogatories on the liability issues determined that the instruction was not harmful .error).
40. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 907 (1982).
41. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 363 (1991); Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991).
42. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators); Lake County Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (regional officials). While the
Supreme Court has not held that the immunity applies to local legislators specifically, in
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 278 (1990), the Court held that some of the same
considerations in determining absolute immunity for state legislators must govern a court's
exercise of discretion in cases involving local legislators. The Eleventh Circuit extended the
immunity to local legislators in Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1193, as have the majority of circuit
courts. See Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1259 (1988).
43. 923 F.2d 1482 (lth Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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Warren County IndustrialPark Corp. v. Front Royal" and held that lo-

cal legislators were not entitled to-absolute immunity in voting to deny a
development permit because acts of zoning enforcement, rather than
rulemaking, were not legislative activities.' s In Brown v. Crawford
County, Georgia,' the Eleventh Circuit appeared to withdraw from its
statement in Crymes, and its reliance on the Front Royal rationale. 47 In
Brown the court held that local county commissioners were acting in a
legislative capacity in voting to enact a resolution placing a temporary
moratorium on applications for mobile home permits for a specified area
of the county until a revised zoning development plan could be reviewed. 4' The immunity was not defeated by plaintiff's allegation that the
legislators acted in bad faith in enacting the moratorium in order to deny
his application for a permit to develop a mobile home subdivision. The
absolute immunity shielded the legislators from claims of conspiracy or
bad faith."
In Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hospital, Inc.,50 the court held that a
county commissioner was not entitled to absolute immunity from claims
of intentional race discrimination in personnel decisions that he made in
his role as overseer of the county's health and human services matters25
The challenged personnel decisions were administrative actions that were
not "'an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes'
by which legislators pass laws."52 The remaining commissioners, however,
were entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they did not act to
44. 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1989), appeal following remand, 945 F.2d 760, 762-65 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1477 (1991). On a subsequent appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in plaintiff's favor and ordered the district court to abstain. 945 F.2d 760,
764-65 (4th Cir. 1991).
45. 923 F.2d at 1484-86. In comparison, the Board's vote to remove a road from the
county truck route ordinance was legislative in nature.
46. 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
47. The court cited Crymes for the proposition that the commissioners were entitled to
absolute immunity from a claim that they voted to deny a development permit. Id. at 1012.
However, it was precisely for that claim that the court in Crymes held absolute immunity
was not available at the motion to dismiss stage. The court in Crymes actually held that the
legislators were entitled to immunity from a claim that they voted in bad faith to remove a
road from a county truck route ordinance, which they determined to be an action of general
policymaking rather than enforcement. 923 F.2d at 1485.
48. 960 F.2d at 1012.
49. Id. Indeed, the court in Brown held that even though the county was not a party to
the appeal, the district court should dismiss the action against all the remaining defendants
on remand. Because Brown's only claim against the county was for the alleged discriminatory action of the commissioners to which they were entitled to absolute immunity, Brown
had not stated a claim against the county. Id. at 1012 & n.17.
50. 956 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1992).
51. Id. at 1062-63.
52. Id. at 1062 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 -(1972)).
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stop the improper personnel decisions from being made. The commissioners could not be held liable for failing to introduce a resolution calling for
the redistribution of commission assignments because "the decision of
whether or not to introduce legislation is one of the most purely legislative acts that there is.""
Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Eleventh Amendment"4 prohibits suits in federal court against an unconsenting state, even when
brought by citizens of the state."5 To determine whether the state is the
"real, substantial party in interest" ' in an action brought against a state
official or agency, the court considers the law of the state creating the
entity.5 7 If the state would pay any award of damages, it is the real party
in interest. s In Robinson v. Georgia Departmentof Transportation,""the
court addressed the issue of whether the Georgia Department of Transportation was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Plaintiff argued on appeal that because the Department of Transportation was entitled under state law to sue and be sued in its own name, and
because it was fiscally autonomous from the state, that the Department
was more akin to a political subdivision, which was not entitled to the
immunity. The court rejected the argument, holding that the Department
was not financially independent from the state because of a state law that
provided that the Department had control and supervision of all funds
appropriated for road work by the state and from certain tax revenues.
Although the Department was fiscally autonomous in the sense that it
could allocate and spend its dedicated funds in its discretion without intervention by the state legislature, it could not raise its own revenue
through bonds or other devices and thus remained dependent on the state
for its funds.1 Moreover, any judgment would be paid out of state funds,
53. Id. at 1063.
54. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
55. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
56. Id. 'at 1524 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984)).
57. Id. at 1525 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch, Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280 (1977)).
58. Id. at 1524 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
59. 966 F.2d 637 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992).
60.

966 F.2d at 639-40.
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since the Department's source of revenue was from a motor fuel tax set
forth in the state constitution.'
Appeals From Orders Denying Immunity. The pretrial denial of
qualified immunity may be immediately appealed as a collateral order,
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth." In
Burrell u. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College,6" the Eleventh
Circuit held that the immediate appealability of the denial of qualified
immunity extended to a private defendant who asserted qualified immunity to the plaintiff's claims that he conspired with municipal officers to
remove her from her position as a savings and loan employee.6 ' The Eleventh Circuit has been more hesitant to decide the issue of whether an
immediate appeal is available under the collateral order doctrine for denials of other forms of immunity. However, in Griesel v.Hamlin," the
court determined that sovereign immunity under, Georgia law satisfied
the requirements for a collateral order as expressed in Mitchell. The defendant, an emergency medical technician in a diversity case, sought to
immediately appeal the district court's denial of state law sovereign immunity as a collateral order.66 Because sovereign immunity in Georgia included the attribute of immunity from suit,17 and because that immunity

would be effectively lost if the case was to erroneously proceed to trial,
61. Id. at 640. The Robinson panel held that the Department had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit in state court. Relying on Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 938 n.1 (1985), the court'held that a state's general
waiver of sovereign immunity in state court is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment. 966 F.2d at 640.
62. 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970
F.2d 785, 787-88 (1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1993) (No.
92-1262).
63. 970 F.2d 785 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1993) (No.
92-1262).
64. 970 F.2d at 788. The saving and. loan officer's assertion of qualified immunity was
denied based on the Supreme Court's decision in Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1829
(1992), which overruled Eleventh Circuit precedent, as well as that of other circuits holding
that private defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 claims seeking to impose liability based on the use of state replevin garnishment, or attachment action.
970 F.2d at 794-96. See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir.
1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989).
65. 963 F.2d 338 (11th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 339.
67. Id. at 340 (citing Crowder v. Department of State Parks, 228 Ga. 436, 438, 185 S.E.2d
908, 910 (1971) (suit may not be.maintained against the state without its consent) and Sikes
v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 117, 274 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1981) (immunity from suit is a
basic attribute of sovereign immunity)).
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the denial of sovereign immunity was an immediately appealable collateral order under the Cohen doctrine."
B. Preclusion
The Full Faith and Credit Statute6 provides that federal courts will
give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that the state
from which the judgment emerged would give the judgment. The Supreme Court has held that preclusion is applicable to claims brought pursuant to section 1983.70 In a decision intertwining the federalism concerns
of full faith and credit and the Article III concerns embodied in the ripeness doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit in Fields v. SarasotaManatee Airport
Authority71 created an exception to the application of full faith and
credit for property owners' alleging federal due process and takings
claims who are required by the ripeness doctrine to first pursue state
court remedies. 72 The ripeness doctrine for claims arising under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments alleging the taking of property without just
compensation requires that a plaintiff first pursue any available state
court remedies for just compensation prior to bringing suit in federal
court . a However, if a plaintiff litigates his claim in state court, applicable
laws of preclusion might bar the plaintiff from later suing in federal court
on the same cause of action."4 In Fields the Eleventh Circuit held that the
68. Id. at 340-41. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Second Circuit had held that the
principles supporting immediate appealability for qualified immunity orders applied equally
to the assertion of state law sovereign immunity in a diversity case. Id. at 340. See Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1991). Because federal law determines the appealability
of a district court order denying summary judgment on state law immunity grounds in a
diversity case, and the Cohen factors were applicable to the denial of sovereign immunity,
immediate appellate jurisdiction existed to review the denial of immunity. Napolitano, 949
F.2d at 621.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Section 1738 provides in relevant part:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
70. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (res judicata); Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (collateral estoppel).
71. 953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 1305-06.
73. Williamson County Regional Planning, Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnston
County, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
74. See generally Migra, 465 U.S. at 75 (res judicata); Allen, 449 U.S. at 90 (collateral
estoppel).
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England reservation procedure ' was not strictly applicable to federal
takings claims because the plaintiff has no right to sue in federal court
firt, due to the lack of ripeness, and thus could not comply with the first
step of the England procedure."" In order to resolve the difficulty, the
court resurrected a procedure it styled as a Jennings reservation, relying
on the 1976-Fifth Circuit decision of Jennings v. Caddo Parish School
Board.7 The court'held that "would-be federal court litigants who are
forced to pursue state court proceedings in order to satisfy exhaustion
requirements imposed by federal law incident to a takings clause claim
are 'involuntarily' in the state courts" and thus may make a reservation
in state court of the right to litigate their federal claims in federal court."
The court noted that a Jennings reservation is effective only when: (1)
the litigant is precluded from filing suit in federal court in the first instance; and (2) the litigant is in state court involuntarily2' In Fields the
litigant failed to make a Jennings reservation in the state court. The
mere failure to raise the federal claims in state court was not an effective
reservation of a federal forum for litigation of the federal claims.8s

75. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), the
Supreme Court held that a litigant who has the option of going into state or federal court
with a § 1983 claim, and who is required to proceed involuntarily into state court, may
reserve the right to litigate his federal claims in federal court by making a so-called England
reservation, an announcement to the state court of his intention to litigate his federal claims
in federal court after litigating the state claims in state court. Id. at 415. The procedure is
for the litigant to first file in federal court; the district court will then stay the federal proceedings to allow the state court to consider the state law claims, and then the litigant will
make an England reservation of his federal claims in state court. Id. at 417-22.
76.

953 F.2d at 1305.

77. 531 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429.U.S. 897 (197 .The Eleventh Circuit noted that the decision in Jennings abolished the England reserv tion requirement of
filing first in federal court and noted that the Jennings panel may ha e misread England
and thus unduly broadened the England exception to full faith and credit. 953 F.2d at 1305.
However, because takings clause plaintiffs are in a sense "involuntarily"'i state court, the
court in Fields held that the decision in Jennings could be brought within the Supreme
Court's decision in England. Id. at 1306.
78.

953 F.2d at 1306.

79. Id. The court noted that it could identify only two situations in which the criteria
would be met: "(1) when a defendant in a non-removable state court action wishes to pursue
a federal law counterclaim; and (2) when federal law imposes an exhaustion requirement
upon a would-be federal court litigant as a precondition of bringing his federal claims in
federal court." Id. However, the court noted that if other circumstances existed meeting the
requirement for a Jennings reservation, the doctrine would be applicable to reserve a federal court forum for federal claims. Id. at 1306 n.6.
80.

Id. at 1308-09.
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C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Abstention. Abstention is a judicial doctrine that embodies
federalism
and comity concerns and can be an important preliminary defense to
state law claims proceeding in federal courts." The 1992 case of Luckey
v. Millers concerned the plaintiffs' challenge to Georgia's indigent criminal defense system, alleging that it violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. After a tortuous appellate history, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the suit was barred
on Younger abstention 83 grounds. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the Younger abstention only prevented the court from restraining
ongoing criminal prosecution and was not warranted when the injunction
related to systemic issues that could not be raised in individual cases. The
district court, as affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, held that the abstention was warranted because the systemic relief sought by plaintiffs would
interfere with every state criminal proceeding, and the state
courts had
4
the authority to consider the claims raised by plaintiffs.8
Standing. Article III of the Constitution, addressing the federal court
system, restricts federal court jurisdiction to "cases" or "controversies"
and establishes the scope of matters that federal courts can determine.s
The concept of standing, a party's right to have a federal forum decide
matters, thus has constitutional dimensions. The ability of the plaintiff to
establish an injury to himself is a central part of that inquiry. In its pivotal 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,8 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed standing requirements which have particular significance for
government defendants in federal court. In Lujan the Court addressed
constitutional standing implications of statutes containing the so-called
81. See Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1991), for a thorough overview of
the forms of the doctrine.
82. 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
83. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger the Supreme Court held that
district courts should abstain from enj6ining ongoing criminal proceedings or civil proceedings in aid of criminal jurisdiction or involving enforcement-type proceedings in which vital
state interests are involved, absent a showing of bad faith, harassment or extraordinary instances of irreparable harm. Id. at 43-44. See also Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1183
(11th Cir. 1983); Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982) (the state had an important state interest in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of attorneys it licensed).
84. 976 F.2d at 677. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that Younger abstention also
was appropriate when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin or control specific events that might take
place in future criminal trials.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III.
86. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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"citizen's suit" provision, permitting any person to commence an action
for injunctive relief to enforce violations of the statute. The issue was
whether a provision87 of the Endangered Species Act of 197388 permitting
any person to file an action to enjoin violations of the statute was sufficient to establish standing on behalf of the plaintiff environmental association. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that when plaintiff
could not allege an injury to itself or its members sufficient to constitute
Article III standing,"8 plaintiffs could not base standing on a "procedural
injury" arising from the citizen's suit provision in the statute." The Court
held that to permit the citizen's suit provision to confer standing, without
the existence of an individualized injury, would violate Article III and the
separation of powers doctrine."'
The Eleventh Circuit has also reinforced standing barriers to certain
constitutional claims. During 1991, the Eleventh Circuit enunciated a
strict standing threshold that required plaintiffs asserting equal protection challenges to minority set aside and affirmative action programs to
allege their constitutional injury with specificity. In S.J. Groves & Sons
Co. v. Fulton County" and in Cone Corp. v. Florida Department of
Transportation,3 the court held that unsuccessful bidders on government
projects had not met the injury-in-fact requirement for standing to challenge minority business enterprise regulations when the plaintiffs failed
to establish that they had been denied specific projects because of the
regulation."" In its 1992 decision in Northeastern FloridaChapter of the

87. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. I1 1991).
89. The Court held that plaintiffs did not have standing, independent from the statute,
to meet the constitutional requirements of Article II. 112 S. Ct. at 2136-39. Plaintiffs' allegations that they had visited certain projects funded by the United States in foreign lands,
had observed the existence of endangered species at the site and that they planned to revisit
the project at some future time and hoped to observe these species did not establish a concrete actual or imminent injury individualized to plaintiffs as a result of the United States'
funding of the project. Id. The Court also rejected several theories of standing based on
generalized public harm. Id. at 2139-40. Plaintiffs argued an "ecosystem nexus" theory of
standing, whereby any person who uses any part of a contiguous ecosystem has standing to
challenge any activity regarding any other part of the ecosystem. The second theory, called
the "animal nexus" approach, would grant standing to anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing an endangered species. The final theory, the "vocational nexus" would provide
that anyone with a professional interest in an animal had standing, Id. at 2139.
90. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. The statue provided that any person may commence a civil action
against the United States or any other government agency alleged to be in violation of the
Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
92. 920 F.2d 752 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991).
93. 921 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2238 (1991).
94. 920 F.2d at 756-59.
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Associated General Contractorsof America v. City of Jacksonville," the
court confirmed its adherence to the specificity requirement. The district
court, after a previous appeal, held that the City of Jacksonville's minority set-aside program violated the equal protection concerns set forth in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co." for voluntary affirmative action programs
and issued a permanent injunction.' 7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on standing grounds and remanded the case for dismissal with
prejudice.9" The court held that to invoke Article III standing, plaintiff
was required to demonstrate direct injury, resulting from the defendants'
alleged violation, which established that plaintiff was within the zone of
interests protected. Because plaintiff sought only injunctive and declaratory relief, it was required to establish that it would suffer future injury
and to plead standing through "specific concrete facts."9 9 The court held
that plaintiff association had failed to establish any injury. While plaintiff
alleged that the Jacksonville ordinance established an absolute bar for
certain contracts, thereby prohibiting its nonminority members from bidding on those contracts, plaintiff had failed to establish that any of its
members would have bid successfully on any of the set-aside contracts
but for the ordinance. 100 Plaintiff was required to allege a specific contract that was lost because of the ordinance and to establish that but for
the ordinance a specific contract would have been awarded to one of its
members. Plaintiff also failed to allege with specificity its claim that it
was forced to discriminate in the award of subcontracts in order to comply with the ordinance because it failed to establish the specific subcontracts and loss of profit associated with the alleged injury. 0 1
Ripeness. The ripeness doctrine addresses constitutional and prudential concerns that a claim does not constitute a "case" or "controversy"
within the meaning of Article III. In the land use context, because the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the taking of property without just compensation, a plaintiff asserting a regulatory takings claim
must obtain a final decision that he has been denied state court remedies
95. 951 F.2d 1217 (llth Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 50 (1992).
96. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
97. 951 F.2d at 1218.
98. Id. at 1219-20. Although the case was decided on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the law of the case doctrine did not bar consideration of the standing of the
plaintiff. The first appellate decision did not rule'on standing and did not discuss it either
expressly or implicitly. Id. at 1218 n.t.
99. Id. at 1219 (quoting Cone, 921 F.2d at 1203-04); see also Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough
County, 983 F.2d 197 (11th Cir. 1993).
100. 951 F.2d at 1219.
101. Id. at 1220.
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for inverse condemnation before the takings claim is ripe. 2 The finality
prong of the ripeness inquiry is required in order for the court to determine "the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit [developmentl."' 03 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,104 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the claim of a landowner that a
coastal protection statute that designated the property as a protected
area and prohibited all development constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. On appeal, the state coastal council argued that an amendment of the
coastal development act that provided for "special permits" rendered the
plaintiff's claim of permanent deprivation unripe because the Court could
not determine whether or not the plaintiff would be able to develop the
property under a "special permit.""' The majority opinion, authored by
Justice Scalia, rejected the ripeness argument. The majority held that although lack of ripeness would have precluded judicial review under other
circumstances, because the South Carolina Supreme Court decided the
case on the merits, the failure to review the case would result in plaintiff
being precluded from seeking remedy for past deprivation. The Court
thus determined that plaintiff's temporary takings claim was ripe for
review.' 06
II. ATTORNEY FEES
42 U.S.C. § 198817 ("section 1988") provides that a district court may
award attorney fees to the "prevailing party" in civil rights actions
brought pursuant to section 1983 and related civil rights statutes. 08 In
prior cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that a plaintiff who wins
nominal damages may be designated as a "prevailing party" for purposes
of section 1988. The Court has defined the prevailing party as one who
"succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of
102. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2906-07 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2891 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340,
351 (1986)).
104. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
105. Id. at 2890-91.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1992).
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) provides, in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981(a), 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title. . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
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the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit"' and who establishes a
"material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties."" However,
circuit courts had split over whether a plaintiff seeking compensatory
damages who wins only nominal damages is entitled to attorney fees.
The Supreme Court's decision in Farrarv.Hobby"' recognized that a
party who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party and that the "prevailing party" inquiry is not dependent "on the magnitude of the relief
obtained. '"" However, as indicated in Garland,the Supreme Court held
in Farrarthat the "technical" nature of a nominal damages award does
impact on whether it is appropriate to award fees pursuant to section
1988. s At this point in the inquiry, the "degree of success" is the most
important part of the inquiry."' The Court held that "[wihen a plaintiff
recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential
element of his claim for monetary relief, [cit. omitted], the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.""'
In Ruffin v. Great Dane Trailers, e a case decided before Farrar,the
Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who failed to prevail on damages
claims, but was awarded limited injunctive relief, was a prevailing party
under section 1988."' The Title VII plaintiff sued his employer for alleged race discrimination, seeking a promotion, lost benefits and backpay,
compensatory damages, and a permanent injunction to order his employer to cease violating Title VII. The district court denied all monetary
relief to the plaintiff but ordered that the employer increase its efforts to
eliminate racial joking and slurs among its employees." 8 The appellate
court rejected the employer's claim that given the nature of the relief
awarded, as opposed to the requested relief, that the award of injunctive
relief was a mere technical victory ordering defendant to do more of what
109.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581

F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
110. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93
(1989).
111. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992). In the case below, Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th
Cir. 1991), Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs who sought $17
million in damages, and who recovered only $1 in nominal damages, were not prevailing
parties within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and reversed the district court's award of
$300,000 in attorney fees to the plaintiffs. Although the jury found that plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated, the court held that the suit was merely a damages suit and
was not the vindication of an important constitutional right. 941 F.2d at 1314-17.
112. 113 S. Ct. at 573-74.
113. Id. at 574.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 575.
116. 969 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1257 (1993).
117. 969 F.2d at 993.
118. Id. at 991.
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it had already done in the past to correct the work environment situation.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the injunction had changed the legal relationship of the parties, as the employer was now required by law to take
affirmative action to correct the hostile work environment, and plaintiff
could protect his rights through seeking a contempt proceeding.",
III.

A.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

First Amendment

Prior Restraint. In Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 120
the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in
NationalistMovement v. City of Cumming,1 21 invalidating a parade ordinance as facially unconstitutional because it required advance payment of
a fee of up to one thousand dollars per day for a permit to conduct a
parade or public meeting in the county. The Eleventh Circuit had held
that the size of the permit fee exceeded the constitutional requirement
1 22
that the fee be nominal, thus constituting a prior restraint on speech.
In its majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the parade ordinance was unconstitutional
on several grounds. The Court first held that the ordinance was an invalid
permit scheme because the ordinance did not contain "narrow, objective
and definite standards" to control the discretion of the administrator in
assessing permit fees.' 23 The ordinance allowed the administrator to assess a fee that could reflect the county's police and administrative costs
associated with the activity to be permitted, with the permit fee ranging
from a nominal fee to a maximum of one thousand dollars per day. Because the administrator could assess the maximum fee or no fee at all,
and could include the costs of police services and administration or not,
Justice Blackmun held that the ordinance vested unbridled discretion in
the administrator." 4 Additionally, the majority held that the ordinance
was not content-neutral because it permitted the administrator to impose
fees based on the costs for security for the county to meet the response of
others to the message given by the speaker; the Court held that a
"[l]istener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regula119. Id. at 994.
120. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
121. 934 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), afJ'd, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
122. 934 F.2d at 1483; see also Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189
(11th Cir. 1991), when the court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to
support the district court's determination that a five cents per paper administrative fee was
reasonably related to the costs of administering the newsracks at rest areas. Id. at 1205-06.
123. 112 S. Ct. at 2401.
124. Id. at 2401-03.
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The court held capping the ordinance's permit fee at one thou-

sand dollars did not save the ordinance; even a nominal fee could not
remedy the fact that the ordinance tied the amount of the fee to the content of the speech and lacked adequate procedural safeguards. 2 6
Government Regulation Impacting Speech. In R.A. V.v. City of
St. Paul, 7 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an ordinance that deemed it disorderly conduct for a person to place on public
or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization, or
graffiti that the person knew or had reasonable grounds to know aroused
anger, alarm, or resentment in others based on race, color, creed, religion,
or gender was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.12 8
The petitioner, a juvenile, was charged with a misdemeanor under the St.
Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for burning a cross inside the
fenced yard of a black family in his neighborhood.'2 9 Even assuming that
the ordinance only prohibited "fighting words," the Court held that the
ordinance was facially invalid
because it prohibited speech based on the
"
content of the message.' The Court held that even when speech was

proscribable because of a content element such as obscenity or "fighting
words," the First Amendment prohibited the government from singling
out any type of prohibited speech, based on its content, for different
treatment.'"
8 2
In Abramson v. Gonzalez,1
the Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida
licensing scheme for psychologists which prohibited unlicensed practitioners from holding themselves out as "psychologists" placed an unconstitutional burden on commercial speech.13 3 The statute sought to regulate the practice of psychology by providing that only persons certified by
the state could hold themselves out as "psychologists"; however, the statute placed no ban on the practice of psychology until a later date. 34 The
Eleventh Circuit held that so long as Florida did not restrict the practice
of psychology, it could not constitutionally prohibit the practitioners from
125. Id. at 2403. "Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob." Id. at 2404.
126. Id. at 2404-05.
127. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
128. Id. at 2547.
129. Id. at 2541.
130. Id. at 2542.
131. Id. at 2544-47.
132. 949 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 1578.
134. Id. at 1575.
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holding themselves out as psychologists."' 5 Because the information was
not actually misleading, but only potentially misleading, the state could
only regulate in a manner that would directly advance its interests in protecting the public from untruthful or misleading information. 36
In Messer v. City of Douglasvile,1817 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a city ordinance that permitted onsite noncommercial
signs but prohibited offsite commercial signs in its historic district was
content-neutral. The court determined that the ordinance was contentneutral because it regulated signs based on their location, not on the content of the message of the sign. The ordinance was a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction because it advanced an important government interest in aesthetics in its historic district and left open alternative
signs in all
channels of communication, in that it permitted off-premise
1 38
parts of the city not designated as a historic district.
Public Employment. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope of a
public employee's right of free speech in his role as a citizen on several
occasions during the survey period. A governmental employer's restrictions or actions violate the First Amendment if the employee is sanctioned for speaking out on a matter of public concern in his role as a
citizen and the employee's interest in the speech is not outweighed by the
employer's interest in providing orderly and efficient government services. '39 The "public concern" element is determined on a case-by-case
basis by determining whether the content, form, and context of the
speech indicate that the speech is a'matter of general public concern.' 0
In Goffer u. Marbury,'4' a former university staff attorney sued her former employer alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right of free speech. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict
in favor of plaintiff because the district court erred in its application of
4 2 The Eleventh
the balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Education."
Circuit held that the district court erred in treating diverse instances of
speech, made under different circumstances, regarding different matters,
to different audiences; as a unitary incident of speech on matters concern135. Id. at 1576. However, the state could permissibly prevent non-licensed practitioners
from untruthfully holding themselves out as "licensed psychologists." Id.
136. Id. at 1576-77.
137. 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, March 25, 1993.
138. Id. at 1510-11.
139. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
140. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
141. 956 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1992).
142. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

1126

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ing the "operation of the university."1 3 The trial court was required to
assess the form, content, and context of each alleged incident of abridged
speech.'" Also, the court erred in its refusal to give an appropriate jury
instruction regarding plaintiff's duty to protect client confidences with respect to her employment, and whether the failure to keep those confidences constituted a legitimate reason for her termination. The Eleventh
Circuit held that while not dispositive of the attorney's First Amendment
rights to speak on matters of public concern, the determination of the
attorney-client role was critical in defining the employer's interest and in
determining whether plaintiff's speech destroyed "close working relationships" or destroyed her effectiveness in her role as an attorney. 4"
In Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority,4 the court
held that an operating room nurse's speech on the overall cleanliness of
operating rooms and the assignment of cleanup responsibilities in a publicly funded facility were matters of personal interest relating to her emPlaintiff's speech conployment and not matters of public concern.
cerned the allocation of blame for the staffs neglect of cleaning duties
and only incidentally touched on matters potentially hazardous to patients. The court concluded that "the private and self-interested character of Pearson's speech in no way draws the public at large or its concerns
into the picture."14 8
In Stough v. Gallagher,'4 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that a sheriff violated the First Amendment rights of a deputy sheriff in demoting him
because he worked for the sheriffs political opposition. 50 The sheriff argued that the demotion was the least restrictive means of meeting the
needs of public service, and that the deputy, who held the rank of captain, held a high level confidential policy making and public contact position, and thus was within the situation in which the sheriff could properly
base employment decisions on political patronage. 5 1 The Eleventh Circuit held that the case was properly viewed under the Pickering analysis,
since the case primarily concerned the deputy sheriffs political speech in
support of the sheriffs opponent."' Conducting the rough balancing test
appropriate in immunity determinations, the court held that plaintiffs
political speech was a matter of public concern and that the sheriff had
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

956 F.2d at 1048-49.
Id.
Id. at 1051.
952 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1278-79.
Id. at 1279.
967 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1528.
Id.

1993]

CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LAW

1127

failed to establish how plaintiff's speech had adversely effected the efficiency of the public services.153 The court rejected the sheriff's argument
that plaintiff's position required a close working relationship because the
sheriff's policies did not require political loyalty for employment up
through the rank of captain, plaintiff's position, and because two levels of
command existed between the sheriff and plaintiff." 4
In Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County,155 the court held that city officials were entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffis First Amendment free speech claims arising from his suspension despite defendant's
stipulation of the public concern issue.1 5' Plaintiff was employed by the
Department of Community Affairs, whose function was to foster harmonious relations between ethnic groups in the county.' 5 Sims, a pastor and a
leader among the county's black community, engaged in a series of sermons and other public speeches in which he made various remarks regarding alleged racially discriminatory practices by the county. He supported his remarks by a boycott of Hispanic businesses and ethnically
divisive remarks regarding Hispanics." s Plaintiff's remarks were published in the newspaper and infuriated members of the Hispanic community. Defendant officials first counseled plaintiff regarding his remarks
and then suspended him for three days. The court concluded that the
interest of the county in providing government services and the disruption caused by plaintiff's divisive public statements outweighed his interest in speaking on matters of public concern because "lilt is clear that the
First Amendment does not provide a right to continued government employment in a capacity that is inconsistent with, and undermined by,
one's off-duty expressive conduct.""
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause. In ChabadLubavithch of Georgia v. Miller,'60 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
interplay of the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First
Amendment. In the per curiam opinion, the court adopted the holding of
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1529. Similarly, in Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708 (11th Cir.
1992), the Eleventh Circuit held that the employee's interest in speaking out on a matter of
public concern regarding her employer's purchasing practices was not outweighed by the
employer's interest in providing government services, particularly when the employer had
failed to establish a legitimate reason for plaintiff's termination. Id. at 712.
155. 972 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1992).
156. Id. at 1238.
157. Id. at 1231.
158. Id. at 1232.
159. Id. at 1236, 1238.
160. 976 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g in bane granted, opinion in panel vacated,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7516 (11th Cir. 1993).
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the district court that the rotunda of the Georgia state capital was a created public forum and that the state could not constitutionally prohibit a
Jewish organization from placing a menorah in observance of
Chanukah.16' However, the court adopted the finding of the district court
that the state could prohibit a fifteen foot high metal menorah in isolation from other holiday symbols, because the isolation of the conspicuous
symbol would communicate the impermissible message that the state was
endorsing a particular religion, rather than recognizing general holiday
16 2
season activities.

Access To Courts. In Brown v. Advantage Engineering,Inc., 13 the
issue before the appellate court was the public's right to access sealed
judicial records in a civil action. In a prior action, defendant corporation
had settled a personal injury suit with an employee after the district
court had rejected the defendant's argument that it was the employer's (a
subsidiary corporation) alter-ego under Georgia's law of worker's compensation; a key provision of the settlement was the sealing of the court
records. 64 Three years later, in an unrelated suit, a plaintiff in a contract
dispute sought to compel the production of the sealed court records in
the employee's personal injury litigation, specifically the corporation's
pleadings on its claim that it was that subsidiary's alter-ego. " Plaintiff
water district then sought to permissively intervene in the dismissed personal injury action for the purpose of unsealing the record; the district
court denied the request for intervention on the grounds of untimeliness.166 Relying on its 1985 decision in Wilson v. American Motors
Corp.'16 7 the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that the standard in balancing
the coihpeting interests of the district court's authority to encourage settlement and the public's right of access was that the denial must be "'necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored
to [. . that interest.' "168 Thus, the court held that the fact that the
sealing of the court records was an integral part of the settlement agreement, or that the court actively encouraged the settlement, was irrelevant; "[o]nce a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no
161. 976 F.2d at 1387.
162, Id.
163. 960 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
164. Id. at 1014.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1015.
167. 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985). In Brown the court held that the fact that Wilson
involved the sealing of the record after trial was "adistinction without a difference." 960
F.2d at 1015.
168. 960 F.2d at 1015-1016 (quoting 759 F,2d at 1571).
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longer solely the parties' case, but also the public's case." 6 Accordingly,
"absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances set forth by the district
court in the record consistent with Wilson, 1 7 0 an absent third party had
standing to enforce the public's right to move the court to unseal and to
view improperly sealed records.'
The court also addressed the balancing of the concerns of the generally
public nature of litigation as against the privacy concerns of individual
litigants in Doe v. Frank.72 In Doe the issue was whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying a former postal service employee's
motion to proceed under a fictitious name in suing his employer. 7 The
court held that the test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously
in a lawsuit was whether the plaintiff had "a substantial privacy right
which outweigh[ed] the 'customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.' "1'7 The court held that
because lawsuits are "public events," "a plaintiff should be permitted to
proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of
a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or
where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the
disclosure of the plaintiffs identity.'" ' Thus, the fact that the plaintiff in
Doe would be personally embarrassed from the disclosure involved in suing his governmental employer for an alleged improper termination was
not sufficient.'"
77
In Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry,1
the panel opinion was modified on rehearing to clarify that while a bank's claims that it had a First
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances provided "addi169. Id. at 1016. The court reiterated its holding in Wilson that not "every hearing,
deposition, conference or even trial in a case of this kind must be open to the public." Id. at
1015.
170. Id. at 1016.
171. Id. Judge Edmondson dissented, on the grounds that Wilson was distinguishable
because the instant case was settled prior to trial, and because the court's holding did not
sufficiently weigh society's interest in having private litigation settled peacefully and without excessive cost. Id. at 1016-18 (Edmondson, J., dissenting).
172. 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 322.
174. Id. at 323 (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981)). The factors set forth in Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffee, 599 F.2d
707, 712 (5th Cir. 1979) were whether plaintiffs challenged governmental activity; whether
plaintiffs were required to disclose information of the "utmost intimacy"; and whether
plaintiffs were risking criminal prosecution by being compelled to admit intention to engage
in illegal conduct. 951 F.2d at 323. In Doe,the court held that these were merely factors for
consideration, none of which was dispositive.
175. 951 F.2d at 324.
176. Id.
177. 980 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1993), modifying 966 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1992).
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tional justification" for the district court's order reinstating the bank to a
Farmers Home Administration's loan guaranty program, there was no basis for the appellate court to hold that the debarment of the bank by the
Farmer's Home Administration in order to coerce the bank to settle a
dispute over the proceeds from a guaranteed loan violated the bank's
First Amendment rights.17 The court determined that it did not need to
confront the issue of whether the bank had a First Amendment right
under those circumstances to determine that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity from the claim. 179 Cases holding that the government
violates the First Amendment right of access to the courts when it prosecutes an individual solely because the person refuses to release civil
claims against the government did not constitute "clearly established
law" for the purpose of holding that reasonable officials should have
known that the bank's debarment might violate its First Amendment
rights.1 s Unlike retaliatory prosecution cases, the bank's debarment did
not include the "loss of freedom or lasting stigma associated with criminal
prosecution," and although the government proceeded improperly in using summary debarment, it had legitimate reasons for pursuing settlement of the dispute with the bank. 81
Ballot Access. The presidential election year yielded two opinions regarding ballot access. Duke v. Cleveland s2 involved the issue of whether
a candidate has a First Amendment right to appear on a party's primary
ballot. After David Duke announced his candidacy for the Republican
nomination for President, the Georgia Secretary of State prepared an initial list of presidential candidates for the Republican presidential preference primary for submission to the presidential candidate selection committee, the statutory body that selects the candidates who will appear on
the presidential preference primary ballot. Duke's name appeared on the
initial list presented to the presidential candidate selection committeeUnder state law, each person contained on the list prepared by the Secre178. 980 F.2d at 1364. The original panel hearing had determined that the debarment
did not impact on the bank's First Amendment rights. 966 F.2d at 1413.
179. 980 F.2d at 1370.
180. E.g., Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (prosecution did not
have legitimate law enforcement objective in seeking release of plaintiff's civil claims .against
the government) and Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal
court may enjoin state criminal prosecution when it finds that purpose of prosecution is to
deter constitutionally protected conduct).
181. 980 F.2d at 1370.
182. 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). Under state law, the Georgia Secretary of State
certifies presidential candidates "'who are generally advocated or recognized in news media
throughout the United States as aspirants for that office and who are members of a political
party or body which will conduct a presidential preference primary'" in Georgia. Id. at 1527
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a) (1987)).
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tary of State will appear on the ballot for the presidential preference primary "unless all committee members of the same political party or body
as the candidate agree to delete such candidate's name from the ballot."""3 All Republican committee members agreed to delete Duke's name
from the ballot, and Duke's name was omitted from the ballot by the
Secretary of State.""' Duke and several registered voters then brought
suit alleging that his exclusion from the ballot denied them their First
Amendment rights of free speech and association. On expedited appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief because Duke had failed to
establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his claim.'," Without
deciding the issue of whether Duke's claims were subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, the-Eleventh Circuit held that the state had legitimate and
compelling reasons to justify any burden to Duke and others. Duke had
no First Amendment right to association with the unwilling Georgia Republican party, since the party legitimately exercised its right to "'identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association
to those people only.' ,, Concomitant to the party's right to define its
membership, 8M was its ability to identify Duke as "ideologically outside
the party."' s The court decided that because the appellant voters were
only foreclosed from voting for Duke as a Republican in the preference
primary, and not as a third party or write-in candidate.in the primary or
general election, the appellants' denial of a right to vote was attenuated,
if it existed at all. 1 9 However, assuming that there was some burden on
the appellants' right to vote, the court determined that Georgia had a
compelling interest which justified any burden. The Republican party
had a constitutionally protected right of freedom of association that encompassed the decision to exclude Duke from the presidential preference
primary ballot.19 0

183, 954 F.2d at 1527 (citing O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a)).
184. Id. at 1527-28. Under state law, if any Republican member of the Committee had
requested that Duke's name be placed on the ballot, the Committee would have been bound
to require the Secretary of State to include his name on the primary ballot. O.C.G.A § 21-2193(a).
185. 954 F.2d at 1530.
186. Id. at 1530-31 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
187, Id. (citing Wisconsin, 450-U.S. at 122 and Tashjigan v. Republican Party, 479 U.S.
208, 216 n.6 (1986)).
188. Id. at 1531.
189. Id. The court noted that there was a strong argument that there was no right to
vote for any particular candidate in a party primary because the party had the right to
select its candidates. Id. at 1531 n.6.
190. Id. at 1531-33 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
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The issue in Fulani v. Krivanek' 1' was whether Florida had imposed an
unequal burden on minority party candidates who qualified by petition
for the general ballot by denying them the option of waiving an unduly
burdensome signature verification fee.192 The Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court's holding that the statute did not violate the minor
party's equal protection and First Amendment rights."93 Plaintiffs, the
New Alliance Party, and its presidential candidate in 1988, alleged that
excluding minority party candidates from the waiver of the signature-verification fee of ten cents per signature when it was unduly burdensome
imposed an unequal burden on minority party candidates 19' The court
first held that its decision in LibertarianParty of Floridav. Florida,'s in
which the court upheld the constitutionality of the similar state petition
requirements for minority candidates for state-wide office, was not controlling because that case did not address the constitutionality of the feewaiver provision." s6 The Eleventh Circuit expressed some doubt as to the
191. 973 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
192. Florida's ballot scheme provides that minority party and independent candidates
for United States President must submit petitions containing the signatures of at least one
percent of the registered voters in Florida. Id. at 1539 (citing FLA. STAT. § 103.021(3)
(1992)). The court in Fulani held that it was well-established that the difference in treatment between minority and independent candidates, and major political parties (whose
names are placed on the ballot by the governor) was not unconstitutional. Id. (citing American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 793-94 (1974)). The candidate must pay ten cents
per signature, or the actual cost, which ever is less, to the state for verifying the signatures.
If the candidate obtains 1.15 percent of the registered voters, then the candidate can have
the state conduct a random sample of the signatures, at the cost of ten cents per signature
actually checked. Plaintiffs argued that the cost savings from the random sample alternative
might be offset by the additional cost incurred in obtaining additional signatures. Id. at
1540.
193. Id. at 1539.
194. The Florida statutory scheme provided for a waiver of the petition verification fee
for reasons of undue hardship for major-party candidates and 'for independent candidates
and ballot initiatives, but'expressly excluded minority parties seeking to obtain a ballot
position. Id. at 1540. The court held that there was no issue of the unconstitutionality of
conditioning access to the ballot on payment of the signature verification fee because it had
previously held Florida's fees for signature verificatiqn not unconstitutional. Id. (quoting
Libertarian Party y. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984)). 195. 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
196. 973 F.2d at 1541-42. The court in Fulani held that the decision in Libertarian decided that the petition requirement for state offices (three percent) was cohstitutional because it advanced the state's important interest in insuring some amount of popular support
before putting the candidate's name on the ballot. The court in Libertarian also decided
that the fact that the petition requirement applied only to minority party candidates, and
that independent candidates were not subject to the petition requirement, was not unconstitutional because it was justified to achieve the goal of assuring the voters that the party
designation was an ongoing statewide political organization. Id. As addressed previously, the
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appropriate standard to apply in a ballot access case that alleged a denial
of equal protection, following the Supreme Court's 1992 precedents in the
area,1s7 but concluded that the balancing test set forth in Anderson v.
Celebrezze °s was the correct standard, as opposed to the traditional
strict scrutiny test.'" Even applying the balancing test, however, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the fee waiver provision violated plaintiffs'
right to equal protection.20 0 The fee waiver provision directly discriminated against minority parties and imposed an unequal burden the Eleventh Circuit found akin to requiring
an early filing deadline for indepen$2s
candidates,
minority
or
'dent
B. Fourth Amendment
Several cases decided during 1992 illustrate that the Eleventh Circuit is
undecided as to the appropriate standard to apply to claims of excessive
force in connection with pretrial detainees. In its 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor," the Supreme Court held that excessive force claims
brought pursuant to section 1983 must identify the "specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force." 20 ,
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitutional standard under
court in Libertarian also decided that the signature requirement was not "unduly burdensome" as to cost and did not constitute an equal protection violation. The court noted that
in Clean-up '84 v. Heinrich, 590 F. Supp.' 928, 932-33 (M.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 759 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985), the district court held that the same fee-waiver
provision violated the equal protection clause, rejecting the argument that the issue was
decided in Libertarian.973 F.2d at 1543.
197. See Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) and Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698
(1992).
198. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). In Anderson the Supreme Court held that when addressing a
First Amendment challenge to state election law, a court should apply a balancing test that
ranges from strict scrutiny to rational basis, depending on the circumstances. Id. at 789. In
its 1992 decision in Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that every voting regulation was not required to be subject to the strict scrutiny
analysis because that would "tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are
operated equitably and efficiently." Id. at 2063. See generally Fulani, 973 F.2d at 1543.
199. 973 F.2d at 1543. The Fulani panel noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Burdick and Anderson both involved challenges based solely on the First Amendment; the
Court in Anderson noted that it did not engage in a separate equal protection analysis. 460
U.S. at 787 n.7.
200. 973 F.2d at 1544-45.
201. "ld.See, e.g., 460 U.S. at 792 (invalidating Ohio early filing deadline for independent
candidates on grounds, inter alia, that it compounded an independeht candidates organizing
efforts since voters were less interested in the campaign); New Alliance Party v. Hand, 933
F.2d 1568 '(lthCir. 1991) (invalidating Alabama's deadline for independent and minority
party candidates).
202. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
203. Id. at 394.
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which the excessive force claim of a pretrial detainee is to be analyzed is
unclear.2 0 4 In Wright v. Whiddon,105 the Eleventh Circuit avoided deciding whether any Fourth Amendment rights of a pretrial detainee were
violated by use of excessive force against him because "the presence of
such doubt about the existence and content of the constitutional right"
was sufficient to entitle the officer to qualified immunity.2" In United
'
States v. Myers,207
concerning the criminal conviction of a city police officer for depriving two arrestees of their civil rights by using a stun gun,
defendant officer objected to the court's use of a jury instruction on the
Fourth Amendment on the grounds that the proper standard was the
Eighth Amendment "malicious and sadistic force" standard.2 08 The appellate court refused to address defendant's asserted error that the Fourteenth Amendment "shocking to the conscience" standard applied because defendant waived its right to object on that ground at trial. The
court held that the Eighth Amendment standard was not applicable to
the defendant officer's conduct.2 09 However, the court explicitly stated

that it was not holding that the Fourteenth Amendment standard was
210
inapplicable in analyzing excessive force claims.
C. Fifth Amendment
During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' and held that a
ban on construction on coastal lots deprived the owner of all economically
viable use of his property and constituted a regulatory taking of property
that required just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.212 The
Court rejected the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination that
the statute was valid as a regulation of harmful or noxious uses, pursuant
to the Supreme Court's line of cases holding that harmful or noxious uses
204. Id. at 388. The Court held that the it had "not resolved the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate
use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which the arrest ends and the pretrial
detention begins." Id. at 395 n.10. The Court noted that "[i]t is clear, however, that the Due
Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment." Id,
205. 951 F.2d 297 (lth Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 300.
207. 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 123 L.E.2d 445 (1993).
208. 972 F.2d at 1571.
209. Id. at 1571-72..
210. Id. at 1572.
211. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
212. Id. at 2899.

CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LAW

1135

may be prohibited by regulation without requiring compensation.2 ' 8 The
Court held that the "harmful or noxious use" principle was simply the
"progenitor of [the Court's] more contemporary statements that land-use
regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate
state interests. 1 4 The Court held that the harm regulation/benefit conferring analysis was not useful because it "depend[ed] primarily upon
one's evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate. 2 1 5 Accordingly, the Court held that "noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation."2' 1 6 The.Court
thus held that
[wihere the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if
the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows2 17that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with.
The Court held that regulations that deprive an owner of all economically
beneficial use of land should be treated similarly to the per se rule requiring compensation for physical takings of property: "[a]ny limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership."216 When the regulatory action is based upon background
principles of nuisance law, compensation is not required even when the
effect is to eliminate all economically productive use, because2 19that use
was not previously a productive use under nuisance principles.
The Eleventh Circuit awaited the decision in Lucas to decide the issue
in Reahard v. Lee County:2 0 how the categorical takings rule applies
213. Id. at 2897. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy
diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards).
214. 112 S. Ct. at 2897 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987)).
215. Id. at 2898.

216. Id. at 2899.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2900.
219. Id. at 2900-01, For example, the Court wrote that the owner of a nuclear generating
plant would not be entitled to compensation when it was ordered to remove the plant because it sits on an earthquake fault; similarly, an owner of a lake bed would not be entitled
to compensation for denial of a permit to engage in landfilling which would flood another's
land. Id.
220. 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir.), modified, 978 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1992). In an addendum opinion, the court further instructed the district court on remand to address whether
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when only a part of a landowner's property is rendered unusable by regulation."' 1 In Reahard the lower court held that a county's adoption of a
comprehensive land use plan that classified the plaintiff's property as a
Resource Protection Area, limiting development to a single resident or for
uses of a recreational nature, constituted a partial regulatory taking
under the Fifth Amendment.22 2 On appeal, noting that Lucas had not resolved the categorical partial takings issue, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
and remanded the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the landowner's
claim for compensation admitted and assumed that the legislation substantially advanced a legitimate state interest and the only issue was
whether the owner had been denied all or substantially all economically
viable use of the property.228 The court remanded the case for an appropriate takings analysis, which the court held would involve inquiry into
the history of the property, the nature of the title, the nature of the land
and its former uses, the history of development, the history of zoning and
regulation, the present nature of the property, the reasonable expectation
of the owner under state common law, the reasonable expectations "of
neighboring property owners under common law, and the diminution in
investment-backed expectations of the landowner after passage of the
2
2 4

ordinance.

The Supreme Court has held that a physical taking of property, regardless of how incidental, is a per se violation of the Fifth Amendment.2 25
When the government acts to prohibit an owner's right to exclude other's
physical presence on the property without payment of compensation, the
action constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment because the right
to exclude others is a fundamental property right.2 2s In Cable Holdings of
Georgia v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd.,227 the issue was whether
the federal statute granting cable franchisees the right of access to public
rights of way and easements "dedicated for compatible uses" constituted
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the takings claim on ripeness grounds. 978
F.2d at 1213.

221. 968 F.2d at 1134 n.5.
222.
223.

Id. at 1133-34.
Id. at 1136.

224. Id.
225. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982). In
Loretto the Court held that a requirement that an owner of an apartment building permit a

cable company to install its cable on his property was a per se taking of property which
required compensation, regardless of the importance of the state's interest in providing
cable access. Id. at 426.
226. Id. at 433. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (Inual rent control
ordinance regarding mobile home "pads" did not constitute a per se physical taking of the
plaintiff's property requiring compensation).
227. 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992). In 1993, the court
denied rehearing en banc. Judge Tjoflat issued a well-written dissenting opinion.
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a taking of the property of the owner of apartment buildings.'" On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reyersed and remanded the district court's
grant of access to the cable company.1" The court held that the district
court's construction of the statute to permit a cable company access
whenever the owner granted private access to other utilities was suspect
since it effectively granted cable companies the unencumbered right of
access held to require compensation in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'3 0 To resolve the constitutional difficulty, the court construed the federal statute to only require an owner to permit access to a
cable company when the owner had formally dedicated such easements
2
for general utility use, and not in the case of wholly private easements. 1
D. Eighth Amendment
In Hudson v. McMillan,2" the Supreme Court clarified that excessive
force claims brought by inmates under the Eighth Amendment, unlike
cases alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs233 or prison conditions,234 need not allege a significant injury.23 The difference in treatment of claims was based on the "'due regard for differences in the kind
of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.' ",236
Because the Eighth Amendment was violated whenever prison officials
"maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm," the presence of an
injury resulting from the cruel and unusual conduct was not required.237
E.

Privacy

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,238 the Supreme Court issued a fractionalized opinion in which the Court, while "reaffirming" Roe v. Wade2 3
228. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988).
229. 953 F.2d at 600.
230. 458 U.S. 419 (1992); 953 F.2d at 605-08.
231. 953 F.2d at 605.
232. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
233. Id. at 1000 (a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs requires that the
deprivation of medical care be "serious").
234. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (in cases alleging unconstitutional jail
conditions, only the deprivation of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim).
235. 112 S.Ct. at 1000. ,
236. Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
237. Id. However, the Court noted that the analysis of whether conduct was cruel or
unusual "necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de ininimus uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327).
238. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
239. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

1138

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

held that "[tihe woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from
the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn,
and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has
sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy
can be restricted. 2 40 In Lucero v. Operation Rescue,"4 the issue before
the Eleventh Circuit was whether the district court had abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff gynecologist and
his patients to enjoin organized and disruptive protests of the clinic
where abortions were performed. Plaintiffs sought relief on the grounds
that defendant Operation Rescue and other persons had conspired to deprive the doctor's patients of their right to equal protection of the laws
and to deprive them of the right to travel."' The Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction, but that
plaintiffs were not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because they
had not established that the challenged activity had "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action.""' Rather, the appellate court held that there was
no evidence in the record to establish that the conduct of the protestors
was motivated by gender-based animus. The court held that "the record
amply supports a finding that defendants' actions were motivated by a
disapproval of a certain activity," namely the practice of abortion, rather
than an animus at women as members of the female gender. 4 Judge
Kravitch, in her dissent, argued that "[tihe majority's insistence that Opto do with women
eration Rescue opposes a 'practice' that has nothing
45
brings abstraction to a new level of absurdity.'

F. Fourteenth Amendment
Property Interest. In order to state a claim that a challenged action
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process, a plaintiff must
establish that he or she has a protectible property interest, or a "legitimate claim of entitlement.""s4 6 In two cases during 1992, the Eleventh Circuit addressed when government contractors are entitled to allege violations of their due process as a result of the termination of business with
240. 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
241. 954 F.2d 624 (l1th Cir. 1992). See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113
S. Ct. 753 (1993).

242.

954 F.2d at 626.

243. Id. at 628 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 829 (1983)).
244. Id. at 628-29.
245. Id. at 632.
246. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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the government. In Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry,"4 7 the Eleventh
Circuit held that a bank debarred from participation in a Farmers Home
Administration loan guaranty program had not stated a procedural due
process claim for violation of debarment procedures because federal law
did not create an entitlement in the loan guaranties. 2 4 In PataulaElectric Membership Corp. v. Whitworth, 4 9 however, the court held that a
disappointed bidder for a state contract had a protectible property interest under Georgia law based upon the state department's manual that
interpreted the provisions of the state purchasing statute.25' Even though
the determination of the lowest responsible bidder was left to the discretion of the purchasing official, plaintiffs had at least stated a claim for
defendants' abuse of their discretion by ignoring competitive bidding
25
requirements. 1
Procedural Due Process. In Battle v. Barton,' 52 a prison inmate
sued prison officials based on his removal from a disciplinary hearing on
the grounds that the removal violated his procedural due process rights.
A prisoner at a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to certain due process
rights. 52 In Battle the Eleventh Circuit concluded that those rights in54
cluded a due process right to be present at the disciplinary hearing.
The disciplinary panel's removal of Battle because of his deliberate obstruction of the hearing was logically related to the correctional goals of
maintaining order and discipline. Therefore, the removal did not violate
the inmate' s constitutional rights.25'
Substantive Due Process. In Burton v. State,"5 plaintiffs sought to
invalidate on substantive due process grounds a state constitutional
247. 980 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing). See 966 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1992)
(panel opinion).
248. 980 F.2d at 1366. The court also determined that plaintiff bank had not been deprived of a liberty interest in its reputation as a result of the debarment because the allegation was not sufficiently publicized and because the loss of the guaranty program was not of
the magnitude of injury to the contractor previously found actionable, amounting to putting
the contractor out of business. Id. at 1365.
249. 951 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 302 (1992).
250. 951 F.2d at 1242 (citing Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Educ., 245
Ga. 533, 540, 266 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1980)).
251. Id. at 1243.
252. 970 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1300 (1993).
253. 970 F.2d at 782. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that the prisoner is entitled to receive written notice in advance of the hearing, to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence, and to receive a written statement of the disciplinary board's findings., Id. at 563-66.
254. 970 F.2d at 782.
255. Id. at 783.
256. 953 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir. 1992).
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amendment that amended Georgia's law of sovereign and official immunity.2 " The Eleventh Circuit found that because plaintiffs were not alleging systematic constitutional deficiencies, but only a dilution of their
right to vote with respect to the proposed constitutional amendment, that
plaintiffs were required to "[demonstrate] that the state's choice of ballot
language so upset the evenhandedness of the referendum that it worked a
'patent and fundamental unfairness.' "ss Because the ballot language was
not so misleading that the voters could not recognize the subject matter
of the amendment, there was no violation of due process.""
. Equal Protection. In H.K. Porter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 60
the court addressed the problems faced by a local government enacting a
self-initiated affirmative action plan. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. regarding the strict scrutiny standard to be applied to state and local affirmative action plans," 1 the Eleventh Circuit held that a federal statute which merely required
"affirmative action," without an express set-aside requirement, leaving to
the state or local government the decision of the appropriate type of affirmative action policy, was not an express Congressional mandate warranting that the court review the county's set-aside ordinance on the intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny basis. 2 602 Under a strict scrutiny

standard, the appellate court held that the decision in Croson required at
least that there be a finding of earlier discrimination that affected the
industry; the government must be able to establish that there were actual
instances of past discrimination and that the set-aside plan is necessary
to remedy that discrimination, and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal. Because the county made no investigation to determine if there was
discrimination in the industry prior to enacting the ordinance, the ordinance was void.26 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a number of opinions
during 1992 that were considerable contributions to the court's constitutional civil law jurisprudence. However, the court failed to provide for a
consistent application of the qualified immunity defense. The court's decisions limiting the defense at trial, and the inconsistent application of
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1269 (quoting Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1315 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Id,at 1270-71.
975 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1992).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
975 F.2d at 764-65.
Id. at 766.
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the defense in circuit decisions, not only strikes at the very purpose of the
defense, but skews the analysis of the underlying substantive law. The
grant of rehearing en banc in Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Department2 64 during 1993 provides an excellent opportunity for the court
to address the intracircuit conflict.
The survey period was a prodigious one for the Eleventh Circuit in the
arena of the First Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit issued a line of
opinions addressing the free speech rights of public employees and ballot
access. The court also was active in defining the appropriate role of the
government in regulating activities with the potential for impact on rights
of free speech and association.

264. 962 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc granted and panel opinion vacated,
982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993).

